tion. In the well-known MDP [Malinvaud, 1970 ; Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin, 1971] process, for instance, the agents transmit to the central board their marginal rates of substitution evaluated at the proposed allocation. Now, if we accept the idea that each agent is free to reject a proposed allocation, we can reasonably consider that he will do so for any proposition that makes him worse off compared with the previous one. The allocation mechanism can then only generate sequences of allocations along which the satisfaction of every agent is increasing or, at least, not decreasing. In that sense, such allocation mechanisms are called monotone processes.
Clearly, these processes based upon allocation signals are informationally much less efficient than mechanisms with price signals. Indeed, with m agents, the allocation space, i.e., the board's message space, has dimension (m -1)1 as opposed to 1 -1 for the price space. And this is without considering the agents' response space whose dimension, for instance, in the MDP process, equals m(l -1), i.e., the dimension of the total message space of the competitive mechanism. What about other properties?
The monotonicity requirement, which is expressed as an exchange axiom in Smale [1976] , obviously implies the individual rationality of the mechanism. It is indeed a stronger property since it concerns every couple of successive allocation signals, while individual rationality expresses just the dominance of the final allocation over the initial endowments. It must be emphasized that the monotonicity property only makes sense for mechanisms that generate sequences of feasible allocations. This, for instance, is not the case of the competitive process.
From the point of view of social welfare, the crucial question is that of the accessibility of Pareto optima. On this point, monotonicity, together with the usual convexity and smoothness assumptions on preferences, ensures important properties. Smale [1973] , for instance, has first demonstrated the accessibility and the stability of Pareto optima (see also Cornet [1981] ), while Schecter [1977] , in a very arduous paper, has established the finite length of monotone exchange curves.
The main goal of this note is to put forth the fundamentals of monotone processes. We therefore give a simplified and unified presentation of these results. For instance, we shall not consider Smale's problems of nonconvexities, nor shall we, contrary to Schecter, bother with the difficulties arising at the frontier of the commodity space. Our simplified setting consists then of a pure exchange economy with the standard assumptions on preferences, and concerns only the interior behavior of continuous monotone processes.
The unified, and as a consequence also simplified, aspect of the presentation results from an extensive use of an allocation inefficiency measure which has first been introduced by Balasko [1982] . It is shown that the gradient of this measure defines a differentiable monotone process which establishes existence of such mechanisms. This measure is then shown to be a Liapounov function for monotone processes from which convergence to and stability of Pareto optima follow directly. Then, and this is the main point of the note, the inefficiency measure suggests a suitable substitution of variable that facilitates the demonstration of the finite length of the exchange curves generated by monotone processes.
Allocation mechanisms without prices are of special interest in planning problems involving production and public goods. In a concluding section, we then briefly explain how the approach followed in the paper easily extends to these cases.
II. THE FORMAL SETTINGS
We consider pure exchange economies with 1 commodities and m agents, but without price system. Let xi = (xi ,x2, ... 
III. ALLOCATION INEFFICIENCY AND THE ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF MONOTONE PROCESSES
The new approach followed in this note for studying the dynamics of monotone processes is based upon Balasko's [1982] inefficiency measure. In this section we first introduce the measure and its properties. We then give the direct consequences of these properties, namely, the existence of smooth monotone processes, convergence to Pareto optima, and the local asymptotic stability of these optima.
Given a point x of X, we consider the set of the allocations that dominate it; i.e., that are Pareto superior to x: K(x) = |x = ... 
Clearly, for quasi-concave utility functions, K(x) is a compact convex subset of X. We call it a lens because of its shape in the case of two goods and two agents. Now, consider in X the Lebesgue measure of the lens K(x), i.e., its volume. This measure, denoted >L(x), can be thought of as the number of allocations Pareto superior to x. In that sense, it reflects the degree of inefficiency of the allocation x.
Obviously, from the smoothness of the utility functions the inefficiency measure >:X > R+, is also smooth. Furthermore, we have LEMMA 1. Assume a pure exchange economy with preferences represented by smooth, strictly increasing and strictly quasiconcave utility functions uj. Then, the inefficiency measure >L(x) is such that (a) >L(x) = 0 if x is in P, and >L(x) > 0 otherwise; (b) for any exchange curve t --x(t) of a monotone process, pL'(t) < 0 when x(t) is not in P; hence, since P is the set of equilibria of monotone processes, >L(x) is a Liapounov function for such processes; (c) the vector fields -grad >L(x) defines a smooth monotone process.
Proof of Lemma 1. For point (a), first note that, for strictly quasi-concave uj's, a Pareto-efficient point x is the sole element of K(x). This implies that >L(x) = 0. The Lebesgue measure is by definition nonnegative. It then remains to show that >L(x) is nonzero outside the Pareto optima. For >L(x) to be nonzero, the lens K(x) has to be of dimension l(m -1). This is the case if K(x) has a nonempty interior. Here, note that the interior of the set C(x) defined in Section II is the interior of the tangent cone of K(x) at x. We then can, since K(x) is compact and convex with our assumptions, equivalently check that the interior of C(x) is not empty. (g1(xl), g2(x2),. .. , g9,(x,,) Along the same way, we have to make precise the notion of asymptotic stability for the case of a continuum of equilibria. Indeed, the usual definitions, like the one given in Hirsch and Smale [1974, p. 186], also implicitly assume isolated equilibria. The natural extension [Smale, 1973] is DEFINITION. Let P be a continuum of equilibria. Then x E P is locally asymptotically stable if P is stable (in the sense stated above) and if for every neighborhood V of x in P there is a neighborhood U of x in X such that every solution x(t) with x(0) in U is defined and converges to an equilibrium in V.
In other words, this means that any solution curve that starts near an equilibrium x E P converges to an equilibrium close to x.
We can now state the properties of monotone processes that are direct consequences of Lemma 1. From Lemma 1 (b) we have iu/(t) < 0, for x i P. Thus, as t --00, the function ji converges to its absolute minimum which is zero, i.e., limtOp(x(t)) = 0.
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But this limit is equal to [L(limtOx(t)) which implies that limt,,x(t) exists. Furthermore, it equals zero if and only if limtxx(t) is Pareto optimal. This ends the proof of part (b).
The stability of P follows from the existence of the Liapounov function ,u. Next, consider a neighborhood V of an efficient allocation in P. Let U be any lens K(x) such that K(x) n P is a subset of V. Since any monotone exchange curve starting in K(x) lies in K(x), and converges to a point of P, it converges to an equilibrium in P f U C V. Part (c) is thus proved.
Q.E.D.
IV. FINITE LENGTH OF THE EXCHANGE CURVES
We have now established that monotone processes always lead to Pareto optima and that these optima are locally asymptotically stable. For the achievement of optima to be interesting from the economic point of view, it has to be realizable into a finite lapse of time. Mathematically, this property of finite time corresponds to the finite length of the trajectories that lead from any allocation x in X to Pareto optima. The following theorem is then essential to give economic significance to the results of the preceding section. Clearly, the integrals in the right-hand side are definite, and so is s(O). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Q.E.D.
Remark. Theorem 3 ensures that wherever a monotone exchange curve starts, it converges in finite time to a Pareto optimum. It says nothing more, however, about the speed of convergence. From the equations (1) and (2) in the proof, we see that the length of the exchange path does not depend upon the length of the vectors q}(x). It is only determined by the angles 0(t) and by the length of the gradients of the inefficiency measure along the path. Thus, the shortest exchange path will be obtained when (i) the norms IIgrad 1i(x(t))II are large and (ii) the vectors 4(x) are close to the gradients grad ,u(x) so as to render the angles 0(t) small. This last condition then suggests that the process -grad [L should be among the more efficient ones.
V. ECONOMIES WITH PRODUCTION AND PUBLIC GOODS
Until now, we have considered monotone processes in pure exchange economies only. Note, however, that the results can be extended to economies with production and public goods without great difficulties. We give just a few indications about it.
First, we characterize an economy with public goods and production. We consider h public goods. Let xp, xi E Rl+h denote a commodity bundle of consumer i. The amounts xp of public goods in these bundles must be the same for each consumer i. Now, to extend the approach followed in this paper, it remains to define the appropriate inefficiency measure. Consider the natural projection -rR(1+ n)h+(m+n)l > Rh-ml; z = (x ,y ,xgy) -> (x ,x). Clearly, rr(K(z)) is a compact subset of 'r(Z). A legitimate inefficiency measure of a program z is then given by the Lebesgue measure pu of 7r(K(z)) as a subset of 7r(Z). In the same way we define Pl, as the natural projection of the set of Pareto optima with production. For establishing the properties of monotone processes, one then checks that the map ,u : z --> iu(z) has the same properties
